Authoritarians wage warfare with combined effect influence that democracies fail to recognize as “real war.” It’s holistic warfare, so a persistent victory requires prevailing over time. The problem for democracies is that many so-called peacetime operations are, to our adversaries, part of warfare. Psychological and physical fighting with narrative strategies shape conditions for further warfare. By the time we recognize them as forms of warfare, we face faits accomplis that cost more blood and treasure. Or, we capitulate by default, as in Ukraine, 2014.

Note: by warfare, I refer to methods of war, while war is the state of hostile relations often contrasted with peace. 

When authoritarians shape the conditions of warfare, they can achieve destructive effects—both psychological and physical. An example of combining both is provoking a head of state to use armed force against a minority ethnic group agitated by an external power (Georgia, 2008). Ukraine 2014 and Georgia 2008 saw the Russian Federation fabricating pretexts for physical military invasions. We recognize the latter as warfare. So, how did he do it? Granted, Georgia was and still is not a NATO ally. That’s a vulnerability which Putin exploited by using information as an operation:

Putin’s Russia regularly uses information in operations to exploit democracies’ idealistic “when deterrence fails” approach to warfare. Until the Russian people end his kleptocracy, Russia’s opportunistic combined effect warfare and fatalistic “Russians are victimized” narrative won’t stop. Why? The strategy works because a fundamental gap exists. Democracies restrain themselves by legal permissions and authorities consistent with representative government and values such as individual rights. To prevail, democracies need to:

(1) Cognitively maneuver and engage for information advantage

(2) Communicate a persuasive and compelling narrative

(2) Generate superior effects and influence

In the highly dynamic and densely interconnected information environment, war’s combined effects rage all the time, not just when deterrence of violence fails.

Understanding Combined Effects and Concepts of Influence

To compete with authoritarian systems, we need to think in at least 3-D. Visual analytics and digital intelligence platforms such as SightXR, SeekerXR, and GraphXR provide acute insights. AI can handle at least 6-D and learn definitions and abbreviations. So we must prepare now.

Combinable Effects

Let’s begin with a language of strategy that has eight basic effects: dissuade, persuade, deter, compel, secure, induce, defend, and coerce. These effects are combinable.

Where do they come from? I systematically derived them from three dimensions of strategy, phrased as three basic questions for the strategist: What do you want to prevent or cause? How psychological or physical do you want your ends, ways, and means to be? How cooperative and confrontational do you want your ends, ways, and means to be?

Note: ends, ways, and means are the basic elements of any strategy.

The eight combinable effects compare to just three effects in the prevailing paradigm, coercion theory. Coercion theory offers coercive compellence, coercive deterrence, and brute force. That idea is to fight with brute force (go to war) “when deterrence fails.” Deterrence of what? Just violent conflict. This approach reinforces our self-inflicted strategy gap.

Instead of that, when we consider the three basic dimensions of strategy across the three basic elements (ends, ways, and means), we get the eight basic effects.

• Half of the effects are preventive, and half are causative
• Half of them are psychological, and half are physical
• Half are cooperative (italicized), and half confrontational

Note: the effects’ abbreviations include the first letter, followed by a consonant. Here they are: Dissuade Ds, Persuade Pr, Deter Dt, Compel Cp, Secure Sc, Induce In, Defend Df, Coerce Cr). The abbreviations offer a “strategy at a glance” look.

These three dimensions of strategy can help design combinations of effects across the three basic elements of strategy. Because they are combinable, the eight effects can be synergistic compared to single effects. Combined effects are broader than combined arms because they emerge from more than military ways and means.

Imposing Dilemmas

Like combined arms, they impose dilemmas on opponents. Such as, deterring intervention while coercing compliance.

To encourage a holistic (or at least whole of government) approach, I categorize the effects according to common functions. These are diplomatic (D), informational (I), military (M), economic (E), and social (S). I added “S” to DIME because combined arms and coercion theory generally ignore social functions as tools of warfare. Social functions are supposed to be in peacetime, right?

Well, authoritarians do not follow this restraint, waging warfare on their own citizens. Russia and China even claim ethnic sovereignty over other countries’ citizens wherever “their” people live. This cognitive maneuver exploits the relative permeability of democracies. Simply add a “victimized by foreigners” narrative (select the foreign occupation in China’s late Qing dynasty and periods between 1612-1941 in Russia/Soviet Union) and subtract China’s and Russia’s own imperial aggression, and you get the sum total of officially approved history.

Basic Concepts of Influence

Definition: a “concept of influence” is how ways and means affect will and capability to achieve effects.

Concepts of influence can broaden and inform concepts of operations. How?

To bring about an effect, we need to explain how our action intends to influence will or capability. An action includes an activity, task, or operation. Also, deliberate inaction is an “action,” such as stopping a standard practice when it’s not effective. Some concepts of operations do this, but many do not. Our 3-D framework includes 16 concepts of influence because each effect results from influencing will or capability. An action may target will and/or capability, such as, assure the will or enhance capability, or both. Concepts of influence explain how the ways and means effect will or capability to achieve the ends.

Like the eight effects, these concepts of influence are just basic. They come from the intersection of the three strategy dimensions. Communities of interest and “school houses” consider more effects and ways & means to achieve ends.

Let’s apply this combined effect influence strategy to Ukraine in 2014 and 2023. I identify, break down, then put together the Russian Federation (RF) combined effect for each case, followed by the RF concept of influence. The idea is to analyze and synthesize, not just analyze and put the same pieces back together with no additional insight. Then I present the US, NATO, and Ukrainian responses.

Combined Effect Influence in Ukraine, 2014

After decades of claiming Ukraine as Russian territory and mobilizing anti-West sentiment, Vladimir Putin pressured President Viktor Yanukovich to reject European Union integration. A human factor analysis of Yanukovich’s behavioral tendencies can explain why but it is beyond our scope here. Yanukovich’s action prompted demonstrations in Kyiv. As Yanukovich lost domestic support and fled Ukraine, pro-EU opposition parties stepped in. Ensuing domestic divisiveness and disagreements over European Union (EU) and International Monetary Fund loans provided opportunities. RF forces staged exercises and activated pro-Russia separatists.

Ukrainian forces could not stop the separatists’ gains at first but regrouped and maneuvered to contain them. Then separatists received Russian armor and artillery support. A scarcely concealed RF military invasion and occupation reversed Ukrainian government gains. The next step recognized separatists’ declarations of independence in Luhansk and Donestk while deterring NATO from responding in kind or in time. 

The 2015 Minsk Agreement required Ukraine to grant autonomy to the separatist regions. The RF’s strategy was to sustain coercive and compellent influence on Ukraine’s government while deterring NATO intervention and Ukraine’s membership in NATO or the EU. As long as Russian troops remained on the annexed territory, the Ukraine government refused to comply with the Minsk agreement.

The Russian Federation’s 2014 Combined Effect

The RF combined effect at the time was categorically comprehensive: diplomatic (D), informational (I), military (M), and social (S) coercion (Cr), compellence (Cp), and deterrence (Dt). We’ll abbreviate this as DIMES Cr Cp Dt.

The RF combined effect coerced Ukrainian armed forces, compelled ethnic Russians, and deterred direct NATO military intervention. That enabled Russia to annex the Crimean Peninsula. This effort was more than military.

• Cr (Coercion)—the RF coerced the Ukrainian military out of Crimea. Social connections enabled the RF to operate among ethnic Russians where the “Russians are victimized by Ukrainian fascists” narrative was accepted. RF diplomatic and economic pressure on ethnic Russian representatives, backed by coercion, forced sufficient compliance among locals. There was no timely NATO assistance for Ukrainians to resist and, therefore, insufficient will to reverse RF gains.
• Cp (Compellence)—diplomatic, economic, and military intimidation compelled ethnic Russians in Crimea to request annexation into the RF. The lack of NATO will and a defeated Ukrainian military in eastern Ukraine resulted in little counter-influence against RF influence.
• Dt (Deterrence): the swift RF military actions and NATO’s energy dependence on Russia deterred US and NATO direct military engagement, reinforced by RF diplomatic pressure on local politicians in Crimea. However, the RF failed to deter NATO and global sanctions, which hurt the general populace, not just political and military leaders. Thus, the sanctions reinforced the RF oligarchs’ narrative. NATO and the EU expressed outrage and began military training assistance to Ukraine.

How the RF Combined Effect Exploited Democracies’ Self-Inflicted Strategy Gap

Coercive compellence and deterrence combined causative military, social, and political effects (physical coercion and psychological compellence) with a preventive military effect (psychological deterrence). These particular effects fit into the prevailing paradigm of coercion theory, but democracies still failed to deter them. Why?

Here are two reasons.

First, coercion theory, as practiced in many democracies, applies deterrence only to the use of deadly force, not to all the other forms of warfare Russia waged. That’s the self-inflicted strategy gap that happens when we decide to accept coercion theory’s only alternative to coercion: brute force.

Second, economic sanctions against Russia were not sufficient in the short-term to deter Russia’s use of force or other forms of warfare against Ukraine.

As a result, the RF waged cyber, disinformation, and election interference attacks without being deterred from doing all that. Democracies failed to combine, in time, three effects:

• Compel the RF to recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty
• Coerce the RF to withdraw from Ukraine
• Deter RF cyber and disinformation attacks on Ukraine

Mustering both persistently would have required a compelling narrative, which the RF repeatedly attacked with false claims, false history, and false despair.

Democracies failed to wage real warfare—that is, warfare as it is actually being conducted.

The Synergy of Narrative Warfare

The RF applied a synergistic cause-prevent (compel-deter) combined effect to its selected audience. A thoroughly hopeless victimization narrative reinforced the emotionally charged impact on ethnic Russians. This condition created a dilemma for Kyiv.

The dilemma was not being able to stop Russian Ukrainians in Crimea from “requesting” RF annexation without direct NATO intervention. The latter did not come, which reinforced the RF’s narrative in Crimea.

From 2014-15, the coercive compellent effect in eastern Ukraine deterred direct NATO military intervention and timely assistance to counter the RF’s combined effect. NATO avoided providing lethal weaponry to Ukraine out of fear that Russia would retaliate.

Over the next five years, NATO and Ukrainian military training, exercises, and joint operations contained the scope of Russia’s synergistic effect on the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine had been a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program since 1994 but pursued a foreign policy of non-alignment from 2010-2014. After Russia’s aggression in 2014, annual NATO summits implemented a comprehensive assistance plan that focused on self-defense.

The Russian Federation’s 2014 Concept of Influence

The RF concept of influence was denial, neutralization, intimidation, and punishment (deny capability, neutralize capability, intimidate will, punish will). These influences on will and capability effectively coerced Ukraine, compelled ethnic Russians, and deterred NATO.

Note: coercion theory offers denial and punishment as coercive alternatives to brute force, not as simultaneous concepts of influence for combined effects.

Let’s break down the RF concept of influence into four lines of effort, or, as I prefer to describe them, lines of effect:

• Militarily deny Ukraine’s capability to defeat a Russian Federation invasion
• Informationally neutralize Ukraine’s capability to defeat a Russian Federation invasion
• Militarily punish Ukraine’s will to resist
• Socially, militarily, informationally, and diplomatically intimidate NATO’s will to intervene 

RF ways and means that influence Western and Ukrainian capability and will include the following DIMES-wide activities:

• Diplomatic pressure against Western alignment
• Informational narrative of Russians victimized by a pro-Western fascist Latvian government and cyber attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure
• Military equipment and training for separatists
• Economic support of separatists with financial and trade inducements
• Social connections with local politicians and criminals

The US, NATO, and Ukraine’s 2014 Combined Effect

The combined effect of the US, NATO, and Ukraine at the time was diplomatic persuasion, military security and defense, and economic coercion (Dp Pr M Sc Df E Cr). Note the absence of social activities.

The US, NATO, and EU diplomatically condemned the RF annexation, and the US began military deployments to Poland and the Baltic states. Ukrainian forces began to participate as an “enhanced opportunities partner” in NATO exercises. Kyiv received training, non-lethal assistance, and some lethal weaponry from the US. The US, Canada, EU, and other partners imposed economic sanctions on Russia. These effects did not persuade the RF from occupying and annexing Crimea, nor did they secure or defend Ukraine when Ukraine needed it.

US, NATO, and Ukraine Concept of Influence: assure, demonstrate, deny (assure and demonstrate will, exercise and deny capability).

The US and NATO assured Ukraine of their will to defend NATO members (the European Reassurance Initiative), but not Ukraine directly. NATO did militarily exercise the capability to strengthen Ukrainian defense and economically deny Russia some capability to sustain combat operations over the long term.

NATO v. Russian Federation Combined Effects

The NATO combined effect and concept of influence did not compete well against Russia’s broad-based coercive compellence and deterrence. Ukraine’s lack of NATO membership status prevented NATO from responding to Russia in kind.

NATO remained reluctant to station substantial forces in former Soviet states due to a promise made in the 1990s. This fear caused NATO to avoid providing direct lethal aid to Ukraine. While sanctions failed to produce economic compellence, the lack of extended nuclear or conventional deterrence for Ukraine further weakened the overall combined effect.

However, subsequent military training and a limited number of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons increased the professionalism and interoperability of Ukrainian forces. NATO summits and a refocus on collective defense (Article 5) marginally increased defense spending among some NATO members. At the same time, Russia increased NATO’s dependence on Russian oil and natural gas. 

Combined Effect Influence in Ukraine as of 2023

Since the 2014 invasion, occupation, and annexation of Crimea, Russia mobilized Russian Ukrainian proxies, disseminated anti-West disinformation, and leveraged energy resources to influence anti-NATO EU politicians. Six months after the US abandoned its allies in Afghanistan, Russian forces invaded Ukraine from the north, east, and south while deterring direct NATO intervention. Poor Russian logistical planning and staunch Ukrainian defense, aided by NATO-led indirect assistance and sanctions, stalled the RF’s encirclement of Ukrainian forces and reversed some territorial gains.

The Russian Federation’s 2023 Combined Effect

The RF combined effect is diplomatic compellence, informational persuasion, military coercion and deterrence, economic inducement, and social compellence: D Cp I Pr M Cr Dt E In S Cp. Notably, it includes compelling, persuading, coercing, and inducing citizens in Russia.

The RF combined effect is more specifically targeted than in 2014.

The intent is to compel Russian identity among its own citizens in Russia, not just selectively in Ukraine, induce Western dependence on Russian energy, persuade Russians of injustices committed by Ukrainians, coerce Ukraine and NATO to negotiate, and deter direct NATO military intervention.

• Cp (Compellence)—the RF is failing to compel a pro-Russia social identity or compliance among Ukrainians in areas where ethnic Russians do not dominate (west of the Dneiper River). Increasingly, the RF must compel Russian identity and loyalty inside Russia.
• Pr (Persuasion)-the RF is failing to persuade the Ukrainian populace outside the Donbas to fight with Russian forces. RF disinformation, however, exploits divisive issues to weaken international support for Ukraine.
• In (Inducement)—RF attempts to bribe local politicians in Crimea with promises of Russian trade and protection are inadequate given the coalition’s indirectly coercive response; the broad-scale RF ground invasion and ground, air and cyberattacks on infrastructure are failing to gain momentum against trained, equipped, and socially mobilized Ukrainians. As NATO members reduce their dependence on RF energy, RF economic inducement is weakening.
• Cr (Coercion)—the RF’s persistent campaign attempts to coerce Ukraine into surrendering its territorial sovereignty and NATO into negotiating on RF terms. RF suppression and elimination of political opponents in Russia have increased in response to resistance to the invasion.
• Dt (Deterrence)— the RF has deterred direct US and NATO military engagement as in 2014 but has not deterred expanded economic sanctions.

The Russian Federation’s Concept of Influence

The RF concept of influence is to intimidate, assure, exercise, punish, and deny (intimidate and assure will; exercise, punish and deny capability).

These influences on Ukraine, NATO, and Russian citizens’ will and capability are difficult to manage as long as NATO support Ukraine. Compared to 2014, the RF is attempting to compel Russian identity and persuade RF resolve, induce domestic compliance and external energy dependence on the RF, coerce negotiations in Ukraine and domestic stability, and deter direct NATO engagement.

The RF disinformation and narrative are failing to intimidate Ukrainian will, but in Russia, they are assuring enough domestic support to continue the war without unacceptable unrest so far. RF security forces exercise Putin’s will to spread his ironically fascist de-Nazification justification for the operation by punishing and denying anti-war activities. The personal economic costs of turning against Putin are high enough to sustain support for the war pending any actions that affect domestic will and capability.

Coalition Combined Effect

Coalition Combined Effect): diplomatic, informational, and social persuasion, inducement, and compellence; economic and military defense and coercion: DIMES Pr In Cp Df Cr.

The Ukrainian resistance to the RF invasion is producing the following effects: 

• Cp (Compellence)—informational and social compellence includes identifying dead Russians and then notifying their parents and diplomatic lawfare to document RF atrocities; both stir action against the RF
• In (Inducement)—provide alternative information to RF propaganda to instigate a social movement and resistance among military and political-economic elites in Russia
• Df Cr (Defense and Coercion)—mount tactically effective conventional and paramilitary counterattacks to stall and reverse RF territorial gains in Ukraine

The US, NATO, and other actors form a coalition of sorts producing various effects that empower and complement Ukraine’s fight:

• Pr (Persuasion)—reassure Ukrainians of international support against the RF invasion; convince global state and private actors to support Ukrainians with resources; expose Russia disinformation as priming the audience, encouraging Russians to seek alternative sources
• In (Inducement)—provide finances, military training, and equipment to increase hope and incentivize long-term operational planning
• Df (Defense)—protect networks and critical infrastructure, provide economic and humanitarian aid to increase Ukrainian capability to resist; provide analytic support for proactive defense
• Cr (Coercion)—private hackers disrupt Russian cyber capabilities; provide ISR, electronic jamming, ammunition, mobile anti-air and anti-tank weapons, and artillery to destroy RF forces in Ukraine

Coalition Concept of Influence (intimidate, punish, demonstrate, neutralize,  persuade, and deny): intimidate, punish, and demonstrate will; neutralize and deny capability. Pending: actions that influence will and capability inside Russia. Note that Ukraine’s combined effect adds compellence to the coalition’s combined effect.

Coalition information operations are influential in several ways. They intimidate the will of some Russians to remain silent about the war, demonstrate the will to speak the truth and neutralize RF diplomatic capability to deny war crimes. If sustained, that influence can lead to Russian citizens punishing the will of Putin supporters and neutralizing the latter’s capability to support the war. However, to be effective, those efforts need to combine with two others: (1) denying RF forces the capability to maneuver and destroy Ukrainian infrastructure and (2) denying the RF finances to fund the war. 

Conclusions

Authoritarians wage real war that democracies fail to recognize as such. Putin’s attempt to invade all of Ukraine in 2022 and change Ukrainian identity was a deceptive and colossal miscalculation, but he can still win. Putin will continue to target democracies’ will to resist this invasion over time while exacting huge sacrifices among his unfortunate citizens. NATO must maintain unity and exploit Putin’s mistakes with a persistent strategy of combined effect influence. How?

To secure a lasting relative peace, democracies need cognitive maneuvering to gain information advantage. Allies and partners must compete with superior effects that include a meaningful, identity-based narrative. A NATO narrative should recognize that Putin’s warfare poses not only an existential threat to Ukraine, but also NATO’s declared values: liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. By its means, costs, and consequences, Putin is waging warfare in a real war.

What do Russia’s actions under Putin mean in this broad context? The aggression presents a new fascism that employs all instruments of power to influence its targets to achieve superior combined effects. A NATO narrative that reflects its commitment to collective defense is necessary to unify and strengthen NATO’s and Ukraine’s combined effect: persuasive inducement and compellence, and defensive coercion. 

Freedom only comes through persistent revolt, through persistent agitation, through persistently rising up against the system of evil. Martin Luther King Jr.